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COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, Appellant, v. J. A. McCLURKEN 
et aI., Respondents. 
[1] Zoning - Existing Nonconforming Uses. - The utilization of 
four new gasoline storage tanks increasing storage tank ca-
pacity more than five times is not a mere continuance of an 
existing nonconforming use which, when exempted by a zoning 
ordinance, consisted of the intermittent storage of lumber and 
Bcrap metal, preliminary grading, steel beam storage and the 
use of movable gasoline storage tanks. 
[2] Id.-Enlargement of Nonconforming Use.-Even if new gaso-
line storage tanks are utilized for an original nonconforming 
industrial use exempted by a zoning ordinance, they constitute 
an unwarranted enlargement of such nonconforming use con-
sisting of the intermittent storage of lumber and scrap metnl, 
preliminary grading, steel beam storage and use of movable 
gasoline storage tanks, where the new storage cnpacity is more 
than five times the old, the tanks are double the size of the 
largest original and are permanently affixed in a residential 
zone. 
[S] Id. - New Nonconforming Use. - The utilization of gasoline 
storage tanks as an incident to a service station erected after 
adoption of a zoning ordinance is not merely the expM.sion 
of a previously existing nonconforming use, consisting of the 
utilization of smaller movable storage tanks for supplying 
power incident to industrial use, but is a new use. 
[t) Id.-Oontinuance of Nonconforming Use.-The continuance of 
a nonconforming use permitted by a zoning ordinance is a 
continuance of the same use. 
[6] Id.-Enlargement of Nonconforming Use.-It would be an un-
warranted discrimination in favor of certain property owners 
to permit them, by enlarging their permitted nonconforming 
use, to construct gasoline storage tanks in a residential zone 
in which they are prohibited. 
[6] Id. - Structural Alterations. - Construction of new storage 
tanks in a residential zone is prohibited by an ordinance for-
bidding structural alterations of a building used for a permitted 
nonconforming use, since surb tnnks are buildings within the 
ordinance and a prohibition of structural alterations, although 
not precluding routine repair and maintenance, does preclude 
erection of D{,W buildings. 
[1] See 12 Oal.Jur. lO-Yr. Supp. 160: 58 Am.Jur. 1021. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-12J Zoning. 
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[7] Id.-Comprehensive Zoning.-The purpose of a purchase! of 
real property must yield to the public interest in the enforce-
ment of a comprehensive zoning plan. 
[8] Id.-Enlargement of Nonconforming Use.-A real property 
purchaser's intention to expand his business on the property 
does not give him the right to expand a nonconforming use per-
mitted by a zoning ordinance. 
[9] Id.-Persons Bound by Zoning ltegulations.-An owner who 
has Jegally undertaken construction of a building before the 
efiective date of a zoning ordinance may complete the building 
and use it for the purpose designed after the effective date of 
the ordinance. 
[10] Id.-E1fect of Ordinance on Existing PermitB.-A permittee 
who has expended substantial sums under a permit cannot be 
deprived by a subsequent zoning ordinance of the right to com-
plete construction and to use the premises as authorized by the 
permit. 
[11] Id.-Variances.-The fact that variances may have been 
granted to some owners and denied to others does not establish 
unreasonable discrimination. 
[12] Id.-Variances.-The granting or denial of variances rests 
largely in the discretion of the body designated by the zoning 
ordinance for that purpose, and a denial of a variance will not 
be disturbed in the absence of a clear showing of an abuse of 
discretion. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court. of San 
Diego County. C. M. Monroe, Judge. Reversed. 
Action to compel removal of gasoline storage tanks. Judg-
ment for defendants re.-ersed. 
James Don Keller, District Attorney, Bertram McLees, Jr., 
and Duane J. Carnes, Deputy District Attorneys, for Appel-
lant. 
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel (Los Angeles) and 
Edward H. Gaylord, Deputy County Counsel, as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Appellant. 
Bertrand L. Comparet for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-The county of San Diego brought this 
action to compel the removal of four gasoline storage tanks 
allegedly erected in violation of a county zoning ordinance. 
Judgment was entered for defendants, and the county ap-
peals. 
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Defendants' property is about a mile from the center of 
Lemon Grove, a suburban area whose cent.er is approximately 
8 miles northeast of the business center of the city of San 
Diego. At the time of the filing of this action this area was 
predominantly residential with some local business and indus-
try centered around the intersection of Broadway, the prin-
cipal east-west arterial. and Imperial Boulevard, the principal 
north-south arterial. Business establishments were located 
east and west from this intersection along both sides of Broad-
way anil were spottily distributed elsewhere throughout the 
area. Defendants' land is on the southwest corner of the 
intersection of Broadway and Massachusetts Avenue, north-
south arterial approximately one mile from Imperial Boule-
vard. The land is rectangular in shape and extends 660 feet 
south from Broadway and 1,760 feet west from Massachusetts 
Avenue. 
The trial court found that continuously since 1938 defend-
ants have used their property, with the exception of a small 
part not material to this action, for beavy industrial purposes, 
including above-ground storage of gasoline and other fuels, 
storage of paint for industrial painting, wbolesale storage 
and sale of lumber, storage of steel beams and parts of ma-
chinery for beavy manufacturing, storage of rock, sand, and 
gravel, storage of junk and old iron, manufacture of acetylene 
gas and metal bearings, automobile and truck wrecking, build-
ing and rebuilding of beavy machinery, boiler repair shop, 
commercial planing mill, sandblasting, welding, heavy manu-
facturing processes using up to 2000 horsepower in the opera-
tion of machines, and general heavy construction contracting 
business. The court also found that defendants have used the 
entire premises as a unit in carrying out such uses, and that 
the part of defendants' land wbere the tanks in question are· 
situated bas been used for tbe foregoing industrial purposes. 
·Wben defendants undertook tbis use of their land, the neigh-
boring area was nearly all undeveloped, with virtually no 
residences. 
In 1942 the county adopted Ordinance No. 268 (New Series) 
as part of a comprehensive zoning plan for the Lemon Grove 
area. This ordinance divided defendants' property into three 
districts. A retail business district, C-1, included the area 
extending south for 150 feet from the south property line 
on Broadway, thence from Massachusetts to tbe west edge 
of defendants' land; a whoh>sale business section, C-2, in-
cluded approximately the west two thirds of defendants' land, 
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running south from tilE> C-l zone for an additional 330 feE't; 
and a residential district, R-2-A, extending sonth from the 
C-l ZOlJ(', which included onE' third of defendants' land. 
In 1948 defendants erected a retail gasoline station near 
the intl'rsectioll of Broadway and Mllssachusetts A venue. The 
service station was within the area zoned for retail business, 
which permitted that use. Defendants also E'rected four tanks 
to provide storage facilities for the service station. Although 
the tanks are near the service station, they extend approxi-
mately 50 feet within the area zoned for residences. Before 
1942 steel beams and trusses had been stored on this corner 
and there was a preliminary leveling of the land and a service 
road made thereon. There is no disagreement among any of 
the witnesses, however, that until the tanks in question werE' 
erected there were !lu permanent structures of any kind on 
this corner before or after 1942. 
The trial court concluded that the tanks were permitted 
under a provision of the ordinance exempting nonconforming 
uses existing at the time of its adoption. 
Section 17 of Ordinance 371, incorporated by reference in 
Ordinance 268 (New Series) provides: 
"'l'he lawful use of land existing at the time of the passage 
of this ordinance, although such use does not conform to the 
provisions hereof, may be continued; if such nonconforming 
use is discontinued any future use of said land shall be in 
conformity with the provisions of this ordinance. " 
Such a provision is ordinarily included in zoning ordi-
nances because of the hardship and doubtful constitutionality 
of compelling the immediate discontinuance of nonconforming 
uses. (See Jones v. Oity of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304 [295 
P.14].) "The object of such a provision is the gradual elimi-
nation of the nonconforming use by obsolescence or destruc-
tion by firl' or the elements, and it has been frequently upheld 
by the courts." (Rehfeld v. San Francisco, 218 Cal. 83, 84 
[21 P .2d 4Hl].) There is a growing tendency to guard against 
the indrfillite continuance of nonconforming uses by providing 
for their liquidation within a prescribed period. (See 35 
Va.L.Rev. 348, 356; Standard Oil 00. v. Oity of Tallahassee, 
1~3 F.2d 410, 413, cert. den., 340 U.S. 892 [71 S.Ct. 208, 
l)j L.Ed. 647] ; State ex rd. Derlla Realty 00. v. McDonald, 
168 La. 17~ [121 So. 613], cert. den. 280 n.s. 556 [50 S.Ct. 
Hi, ;4 L.Eel. 612} ; Stafe ex rel. Dema Realty 00. v. Jacoby, 
168 La. 752 1123 So. 314].) 
I 
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Given the objective of zoning to eliminate nonconforming 
uses, courts throughout the country generally follow a strict 
policy against their extension or enlargcment.1 
[1] The evidence most favorable to defendants is that in 
their nonconforming use they utilized fuel tanks that were 
moved on heavy skid timbers from place to place as they 
were needed. One tank had a capacity of 1,200 gallons, an-
other 2,300 gallons, and the largest a capacity of 6,000 gallons. 
Now, however, they have four new tanks with a capacity of 
12,000 gallons each, that are 32 feet high and 8 feet in 
diameter and are permanently located upon a rectangular 
concrete base 10 feet wide and 54 feet long. In erecting 
four new tanks double the size of the largest of the old, 
defendants have not only increased their fuel storage capacity 
more than five times but have permanently affixed the tanks 
within the area zoned for residences. Such a formidable ex-
pansion can hardly be viewed as a mere continuance of the 
nonconforming use consisting of the intermittent storage of 
'Rehfeld v. San Francisco, 218 Cal. 83, 85 [21 P.2d 419); Burke v. 
City of LOB .dngeles, 68 Cal.App.2d 189, 191 [156 P.2d 28); Yuba City v. 
Cherniavsky, 117 Cal.App. 568, 573 [4 P.2d 299); Wilson v. Edgar, 64 
Cal.App. 654, 657 [222 P. 623); De Felice v. East Ha'l:en, 130 Conn. 156 
[32 A.2d 635, 147 A.L.R. 161); Piccolo v. West Hat:en, 120 Conn. 449 
\181 A. 615, 617]; Thayer v. Board of .dppeals, 114 Conn. 15 [157 A. 
273, 276); Ware v. Wichita, 118 Kan. 265 [234 P. 978); Goodrich v. 
Selligman, 298 Ky. 863 [183 S.W.2d 625, 627). Dorman v. Baltimore, 
187 Md. 678 [51 A.2d 658, 661); Colati v. Jirollt, 186 Md. 652 [47 A.2d 
613, 615·616); Beyer v. Mayol and City of Baltimore, 182 Md. 444 
[34 A.2d 765, 769); Connors v. Town of Burlington (1950), Mass. 
[91 N.E.2d 212, 213]; Inspector of Bldgs. of Burlington v. Murphy, 320 
Mass. 207 [68 N.E.2d 918, 919); Town of Burlington v. Dunn, 318 Mass. 
216 [61 N.E.2d 243, 247, 168 A.L.R. 1181); Town of Marblehead v. 
Rosenthal, 316 Mass. 124 [55 N.E.2d 13); Town of Lexington v. Bean, 
272 Mass. 547 [172 N.E. 867, 870]; Cole v. City of Battle Creek, 298 
Mich. 98 [298 N.W. 466,468]; .dustin v. Older, 283 Mich. 667 [278 N.W. 
727, 729); Women's Christian .dss'n. of Kansas City v. Brown, 354 
Mo. 700 [190 S.W.2d 900, 906); In re Botz, 236 Mo.App. 566 [159 
S.W.2d 367, 371·373]; Lynch v. Borough of Hillsdale, 136 N.J.L. 129 
[54 A.2d 723, 725·726}; Albright v. Johnson. 135 N.J.L. 70 [50 A.2d 
399); Bllrmore Co. v. Smith, 124 N.J.L. 541 f12 A.2d 353, 856}; Home 
Fuel Oil Co. v. Glen Rock, 118 N.J.L. 340 [192 A. 516, 518}; De Vito v. 
Pearsall, 115 N.J.L. 323 [180 A. 202]; Conaway v . .dtlantic City, 107 
N.J.L. 404 [154 A. 6); Pillage of OS8ining v. Meredith, 73 N.Y.S.2d 
897; People v. Giorgi, 16 N.Y.S.2d 923; Pisicc11io v. Board of .dppeals, 
165 Misc. 156 [300 N.Y.S. 368, 369]; State ex reI. City Ice ~ Fuel Co. v. 
Stegner, 120 Ohio St. 418 [166 N.E. 226. 227, 64 A.L.R. 916]; Appeal 
of Kiddy, 294 Pa. 209 [143 A. 909); .dppcal of Yocom, 142 Pa. Super. 
165 [1f> A.~d 687, 689·690]; Meserolo v. Board of .ddjustment, City of 
Dal1a..~, (Tex. Ch·. App.) 172 S.W.2d 528, f>30·531; Benjamin v. Lietzt 
--l'tab-- f211 P.2d 449, 4511; sce 147 A.L.R. 167; 8 McQuillin, 
Municipal Corpomtions, 3d ed. 1950, § 25.183, pp. 366·367. 
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lumber and scrap metal, preliminary grading, steel beam stor-
age, or even the use of movable tanks •• all over the property, 
first one spot and then another" that may have occurred in 
tbe area in question. [2] Even if the new tanks were used to 
supply power for the original industrial use, they would con-
stitute an unwarranted enlargement of that nonconforming 
use. (See Rehfeld v. San Francisco; Yuba Oity v. Oherniav-
sky; Piccolo v. West Haven; De Felice v. East Haven; Thaye,. 
v. Board of Appeals; Ware v. Wichita; Oolati v. Jirout; In-
spector of Bldgs. of Burlington v. Murphy; Town of Marble-
head v. Rosenthal; Town of Burlington v. Dunn; Austin v. 
Olde.r; Women's Ohnstian Ass'n. of Kansas City v. Brown; 
In re Botz; Home Fuel Oil 00. v. Glen Rock; DeVito v. Pear-
sall; Pisicchio v. Board of Appeals; People v. Giorgi; State 
ex. ,.el. Oity Ice & Fuel 00. v. Stegne,.; Appeal of Yocom; 
supra note 1.) 
[3] The new tanks involve not merely an expansion of 
a nonconforming use but a new nonconforming use. The 
permitted use was for the storage of fuels to be consumed 
in supplying power as an incident to the industrial use; the 
new tanks are used as an incident to the service station use. 
[4] The continuance of a nonconforming use "is a continu-
ance of the same use and not some other kind of use." (Kens-
ington Realty Holding Oorp. v. Jersey Oity, 118 N.J.L. 114 
[191 A. 787, 788] ; Simone v. Peters, 135 N.J.L. 495 [53 A.2d 
315] ; Home Fuel Oil 00. v. Glen Rock; Town of Lexington v. 
Bean; In re Botz; Women's Ohristian Ass'n. of Kansas Oity 
v. Brown; Appeal of Yocom; supra, note 1.) Defendants 
never conducted a service station on their premises until 1948, 
six years after the adoption of the ordinance. Although the 
service station is permitted in its location, the tanks are not 
permitted in the residence zone where defendants erected 
them. [5] No one may erect such tanks in this residential 
district, and it would be an unwarranted discrimination in 
favor of defendants to hold that they may do so· (Rehfeld v. 
San Francisco, supra, 218 Cal. 83, 85; Pisicchio v. Boa,.d of 
Appeals, 165 Misc. 156 [300 N.Y.S. 368,369-370].) 
[6] Even if it be assumed that the tanks did not involve 
a new nonconforming use of the land, their construction was 
prohibited by the second paragraph of section 17 of Ordinance 
371, which provides: 
"The lawful use of a building existing at the time of the 
passage of this ordinance may be continued, although such 
) 
) 
Aug. 1951] COUNTY OF SAN OIEGO V. MCCLURKEN 
(37 C.2d 683: 234 P.2d 972] 
689 
use does n()t conform with the proyisions hereof; suet! use 
may be extended throughout the building provided no struc-
tural alterations, except those required by law or ordinance, 
are made therein. If no structural alterations are made, a 
non-conforming use of a building may be changed to another 
non-conforming use of the same or more restricted classifica-
tions. " 
A "building" is defined in section 1 of ordinance 371 as 
.. a structure having a roof supported by columns or walls." 
c, Structure" is defined as C C anything constructed or erected 
and use of which requires more or less permanent location on 
the ground or attachment to somethiug having a permanent 
location on the ground." It has been held that "building" 
includes a water tank (State v. Ornelas, 42 N.M. 17 [74 P.2d 
723, 725]) ; a dugout or artificial cave (State v. Clark, 221 
Mo.App. 893 [288 S.W. 77]); a silo (Bush v. Norman 
(Mo.App.) 199 S.W. 721); a 35-foot steel tower and 60-barrel 
steel storage tank supported thereby (Griffin v . Holland, 191 
Okla. 417 [131 P.2d 113]) ; an iron fence (Swasey v. County 
of Shasta, 141 Cal. 392, 394 [74 P. 1031]); a sand-hopper 
(Wilbttr v. City of Newton, 302 Mass. 38 [18 N.E.2d 365, 368] ; 
a billboard (Goodrich v. Selligman, supra, note 1; for numer-
ous other illustrations see 12 C.J .S. 382.) Thus, there can be no 
doubt that the four new tanks are "buildings" within the 
meaning of the ordinance. Although the prohibition of struc-
tural alterations does not preclude ordinary routine repair 
and maintenance of existing buildings (see 58 Am.Jur. Zon-
ing, § 156, p. 1026) it does preclude the erection of new build-
ings. If an old building cannot be enlarged, a fortiori a new 
building cannot be built. (RehfeZd v. San Francisco; Yuba 
City v. Cherniavsky; Piccolo v. West Haven; Goodrich v. 
Selligman; Colati v. Jirout; Connors v. Town of Burlington; 
Inspector of Bldgs. of Burlington v. Murphy; Cole v. Battle 
Creek; Women's Christian Ass'n. of Kansas City v. Brown; 
DeVito v. Pearsall; Benjamin v. Lietll; supra, note 1; see 8 
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3d ed. 1950, § 25. 205, 
p.893.) 
Defendants contend that they would have constructed all 
necessary facilities at the beginning to complete the full in-
dustrial development of their property had they had capital 
enough and that since they "had to finish the plant as they 
could earn it, one building at a time," they gained a vested 
. right to continue the development of their land until its full 
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industrial use had been reached. [7] The purpose of 'th;0 
landowner in purchasing the property must yield to the pu~ 
lie interest in the enforcement of a comprehensive zoning ; 
plan. (Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino, 29 Ca1.2d 332, 
337 [171 P.2d 542]; Acker v. Ba.ldwin, 18 Ca1.2d 341, 344 
[115 P.2d 455] ; Sunny Slope Water Co. v. City of Pasadena, 
1 Ca1.2d 87, 93-94 [33 P.2d 672] ; cf. Skalko v. City of Sunny- '1' 
vale, 14 Ca1.2d 213, 215 [93 P.2d 93].) [8] The intention to 
expand the business in the future does not give defendants 
the right to expand a nonconforming use. (Town of Billerico Y .
. Quinn, 320 Mass. 687 [71 N.E.2d 236, 236] ; Chayt v. Board 
of Zoning Appeals of Baltimore City, 17 Md. 426 [9 A.2d 747, 
750] ; Appeal of Kiddy, supra, note 1.) The ordinance hal, 
made allowance for the continuance of nonconforming uses 
existent in 1942; it does not permit the enlargement of such 
uses as the owners find expansion desirable. It is immaterial 
that a property owner in an area zoned for residential pur-
poses contemplated the maximum commercial utilization of 
his property previous to the zoning ordinance. (Sumny Slope 
Water Co. v. City of Pasadena, 1 Ca1.2d 87, 95 [33 P.2d 672] ; 
O'Rourke v. '['eeters, 63 Cal.App.2d 349, 352 [146 P.2d 983]; 
Marblehead Land Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 36 F.2d 242, 
244; 47 F.2d 528, 534, cert. den. 284 U.S. 634 [52 8.Ot. 18, 
76 L.Ed. 540] ; Ware v. City of Wichita, 113 Kan. 153 [214 
P. 99] ; Spector v. Building Inspector of Milton, 250 Mass. 63 
[145 N.E. 265] ; Chayt v, Board of Zoning Appeals of Balti-: 
more City, supra.) Although defendants are confined in their 
nonconforming use to the acth'ities carried on at the time ~ 
their property was zoned, they enjoy a favored position com~i: 
pared to those who purchased property for a nonconforming .j 
use and were prevented from using it at all for that purpose 
because their property was zoned before they could establish ~ 
such a use. 
Defendants rely on In re Smith, 143 Cal. 368 [77 P. 180J 
and Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223, 224 [25 8.Ct. 18, 
49 L.Ed. 169]. In the Smith ease the gas works had been 
erected before the passage of the ordinance. It exemplifies 
the rule that a lawful use existing at the time a zoning ordi-· 
nance becomes effective cannot be prohibited when it is not a 
public nuisance. In the Dobbins ease the owner undertook 
construction of a gas works in a permitted area and expended 
some $2,500 in erecting thr fonndatioIl before a zoning ordi-
nance was passed prohibiting gas works in that district. 
) 
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[9] If aYl owner has legally undertaken the construction of 
a building before the effective date of a zoning ordinance, he 
may complete the building and use it for the purpose designed 
after the effective date of the ordinance. (City of Coldwater v. 
Will1'ams Oil Co., 288 Mich. 140 [284 N.W. 675] j Best & Co. v. 
Incorporated Village of Garden City, 286 N.Y.S. 980, aff'd. 
273 N.Y. 564 [7 N.E.2d 694].) Protection of an undertaking 
involving the investment of capital, the purchase of equip-
ment, and the employment of workers, is akin to protection 
of a nonconforming use existing at the time that zoning re-
strictions become effective. [10] The same principle under-
lies the rule that a permittee who has expended substantial 
15l1mS under a permit cannot be deprived by a subsequent 
zoning ordinance of the right to complete construction and 
to use the premises as authorized by the permit. (Trans-
Oceanic Oil Gorp. v. Santa Barbara, 85 Cal.App.2d 776 [194 
P.2d 148] j Sandenburgh v. Michigamme Oil Co., 249 Mich. 
372 [228 N.W. 707] j Atlantic Broadcasting Co. v. Wayne 
Tp., 109 N.J.L. 442 [162 A. 631] ; Nassau-Fulton Realty Corp. 
v. Schlimm, 67 N.Y.S.2d 501 j People v. Bales, 224 App.Div. 
87 [229 N.Y.S. 550].) 
Defendants contend that they are being discriminated 
against on the ground that neighboring owners were granted 
variances and that over half the lands within a radius of the 
intersection of Broadway and Massachusetts Avenue were 
being used for heavy industrial purposes. There was a sharp 
conflict in the evidence as to the extent and nature of the 
other nonconforming uses in this area. The trial court made 
no finding on this issue, and the evidence does not establish 
unjust discrimination as a matter of law. No zonng ordinance 
can classify districts with perfect justice. Since cases of 
unusual hardship may require variances, zoning authorities 
are usually given power to grant them. [11] The fact that 
variances may have been granted to some owners and denied 
to others, however, does not establish unreasonable discrimi-
nation. [12] The granting or denial of variances rests 
largely in the discretion of the body designated by the zoning 
ordinance for that purpose, and a denial of a variance will not 
be disturbed in the absence of a clear showing of abuse of 
discretion. (Rubin v. Board of Directors, 16 Cal.2d 119 [104 
P.2d 1041] ; Otis v. City of Los Angeles, 52 Cal.App.2d 605, 
613 [126 P.2d 954) ; Larkin Co., Inc. v. Schwab, 242 N.Y. 330, 
336 [151 N.E. 637, 6391. A~ to the degree of discretion 
vested in such bodies, see Lockard v. Los ..Angeles, 33 Ca1.2d 
) 
.:1 
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453,461 [202 P.2d 38, 7 A.L.R.2d 990] ; Acker v. Baldwin, Ii 
Ca1.2d 341, 344 [115 P.2d 455].) 
Judgment reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
SCHAUER, J.-I dissent. The factual issues in this case, 
upon substantially conflicting evidence, were resolved adverse-
ly to the plaintiff by the trial court. Instead of viewing the 
case favorably to sustaining the judgment on contested issues 
of fact, the majority apply a directly contrary view. It is 
further my view that the opinion of the District Court of Ap-
peal, Fourth Appellate District, prepared by Presiding Jus-
tice Barnard, with Justice Griffin concurring (reported in 
99 A.C.A. 957 [222 P.2d 688]), correctly and soundly disposes 
of the issues presented. 
For the reasons stated I would affirm the judgment of the 
trial court. 
Shenk, J., concurred. 
vARTER, J .-1 dissent. 
The majority opinion overrides the findings of the trial 
court based on conflicting evidence and thus arrives at the 
conclusion that defendants were not continuing the noncon-
forming use of their property after the passage of the zoning 
ordinance. 
The trial court found that in 1938, before any zoning ordi-
nance was applicable to defendants' property they used it "for 
heavy industrial purposes, including, among others, the fol-
lowing: automobile and motor-truck wrecking and rebuilding; 
heavy machinery wrecking and rebuilding; boiler shops; 
gasoline and oil storage, above ground; junk yards; lumber 
storage and wood-working, such storage being carried on in 
the open and without enclosure by walls; the manufacture, 
storage and use of acetylene gas; sandblasting; both gas ILD.d 
electric welding; storage of explosives; storage, and use in 
manufacturing processes, of paints, oil and shellac; the opera-
tion of a planing mill; storage of rock, sand and gravel; 
storage of old iron in large quantities ; operation of large ma-
chine shops, using heavy machinery; storage and repair of 
heavy construction machinery; sale of machinery of various 
kinds. That said Defendants have made use of all of the land 
so owned by them . . . as a unit, to be used in its entirety for 
the convenient and efficient operation thereon of the said heavy 
industrial purposes and uses." (Italics added.) It was ape-
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cifically found, with reference to the four storage tanks here 
involved, that: "the portion of said Defendants' said land 
upon which said tanks for the storage of gasoline and other 
fuels were erected and are now situated is within the portion 
of said lands which said Defendants have, continuously since 
the year 1938, used for heavy industrial purposes, as afore-
said." (Italics added.) 
The evidence adequately supports those findings, establish-
ing that prior to 1942, and before the enactment of the zoning 
ordinance, defendants conducted an extensive industrial busi-
ness on all their property, manufacturing heavy machinery, 
constructing heavy equipment, storing, selling and using ex-
plosives, gasoline, butane, lumber, machinery, etc. For illus-
tration, J. A. McClurken, one of the defendants, testified: 
"Q. Now, in this matter of the storage of fuel and lumber 
and paint and explosives and so on, was that restricted strictly 
to any o~e particular portion of the premises' A. I twas 
spread over the entire property. That is what the property 
was purchased for and that is what it was used for constantly 
from that day till this .... Q. Now, with regard to the fuel 
storage there for the use of gasoline or Diesel or butane oper-
ated engines, during what portion of the time did you have an 
above-ground fuel storage' Was that prior to 1942' A. Oh, 
yes, we have always had our fuel above ground. . . . Q. When 
you say tanks off of trucks do you mean the little 15 or 20 
gallon tanks that the trucks, in the engine, gets its fuel from f 
A. No, we have one tank that holds 1200 gallons j another one 
that holds 2300 gallons; another one I think holds 6000 gal-
lons. They have not aU been full, as a rule, at one time, 
but we have used them according to the volume of work and 
according to the needs of the equipment, or according to our 
gasoline usage. Sometimes they would all be full; sometimes 
one of them would be full, and it would vary according to 
the actual gallonage that we were using .... Q. Now, what 
part of the premises did you have above-ground fuel storage 
on' Was it limited permanently and definitely to just one 
tank, or where' A. Oh, no, we had it all over the property; 
first one spot and then another; wherever it was most con-
venient to have it." With reference to any change in the 
use of the property he said: "Q. Now, getting back to the 
various types of manufacturing and storage work conducted 
on your premises, has there been an(y) substantial change in 
the nature of the use of your premises from what it was before 
1942, as you have described it, down to the present time' 
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Have you changed your use! A. No, sir, OU1' operations are 
identical." (Italics added.) In other words, defendants were 
engaged in a highly diversified business which embraced sell-
ing, manufacturing, storing and repairing II wide variety of 
things, and to conduct that business, maintail1f'd all sorts of 
equipment, huge buildings and tanks. That business is the 
same now as it was prior to 1942. The trial court, taking all 
of these factors into consideration, concluded that the use of 
the gasoline tanks here involved did not constitute a substan-
tial change in the use of the property. Certainly that cannot 
be said to be an unreasonable conclusion, yet the majority 
states that it is. By a picayunish selection of trivialities, it 
asserts there was a change of use because the tanks are larger 
than those used formerly and that the· fuels stored are to be 
used for sale instead of defendants' use in manufacturing. 
There is evidence that fuel was sold before 1942, but, in any 
event, the change is not substantial considering the extensive 
and diversified character of defendants' operations. The ordi-
nance exempts uses existing at the time of its passage. Here 
the evidence shows that t.he use of defendants' property is the 
same. They are still operating the same business as before 
the adoption of the ordinance. 
There is no sound basis for distinction between this case and 
Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223 [25 S.Ct. 18, 49 L.Ed. 
169], where the court held invalid an ordinance barring gas 
works where the property owner had partially erected the 
plant when the ordinance was passed. The court there said 
(p. 239) : "Being the owner of the land and having partially . 
erected the work" the plaintiff in error had acquired property .. 
rights and was e~titled to protection against unconstitutional 
encroachments which would have the effect to deprive her 
of her property without due process of law."· If the right to 
complete a partially built structure is protected, certainly 
there is a constitutionally protected right to continue to 
operate the business exactly the same as before (as the evi-
dence shows). Fuel storage tanks were previously maintained 
on the property. There is no more reason for preventing their 
enlargement than there would be for stopping the completion 
of a gas plant. In fact, this is a stronger case, for here the 
industrial business operations are being continued. The true 
test has been stated: "The faet that improved or more effi-
cient instrumentalities are utilized in pursuit of the use does 
not exclude it from the category of an 'existing use' within 
a town zoning ordinance permitting the continuanee of non- .. 
conforming existing uses, provided the instrumentalities are 
) 
) 
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ordinarily and reasonably adapted to make the use available 
to the owner and the original nature and purpose of tke 
undertaking remain unchanged. . . . It is a definitely settled 
proposition of law that the 'continuance of a non-conforming 
use' existing at the time of the adoption of the zoning ordi-
nance is a continuance of the same use and not some other 
kind of use. In determining whether anon-conforming use 
was the same before and after passage of a zoning ordinance, 
so as to be permissible, each ease must stand on its own facts . 
. . . In a recent New York case where a lot in an area zoned 
for residential purposes was subject to anon-conforming use 
of storage of poles, cable and ¢pe, the non-conforming use 
related to storage and the storage of any other object was a 
valid continuation of such non-conforming use unless the 
thing stored was vastly different and in itself created new 
problems, in which case it could be considered a change of 
use." (Emphasis added.) (Yokley, Zoning Law & Practice, 
p. 254.) (See, also, Royal Baking Co. v. Oklahoma City, 182 
Okla. 45 [75 P.2d 1105] ; Borough of Cheswick v. Beckman, 
352 Pa. 79 [42 A.2d 60] ; President ct Trustees of Ossining 
v. Meredith, 73 N.Y.S.2d 897; McIvor v. Mercer-Fraser Co., 
76 Cal.App.2d 247 [172 P.2d 758].) 
Reference is made to the portion of the ordinance prohibit-
ing structural changes in preexisting buildings. Plainly, that 
provision deals with the change in use of the property which 
would follow from a structural alteration, that is, for example, 
if a residence was sO changed that it could be used as a factory. 
The essential factor is still the nature of the use of the prop-
erty. Has that been so altered or extended that the exemption 
for nonconforming uses does not apply T If not, as is the case 
here, there is no violation of the zoning law. 
Finally, it is said that the evidence is highly conflicting 
on whether the ordinance discriminates against defendants, 
but that there is no finding on the subject, and, therefore, 
defendants cannot prevail. There is ample evidence that the 
immediate neighborhood around defendants' property is 
thickly sprinkled with heavy industry and businesses such as 
the storage and sale of fuel. '!'he findings must be liberally 
construed to support the judgment. So construed, there is a 
sufficient finding on the subject. Defendants, in their answer, 
denied tht they had violated the ordinance and that the 
ordinance applied to their property. That denial was found 
to be true. They alleged that their use was" in lteeping with 
permits" granted by the county. That was found to be true. 
) 
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It may be at least implied from such findings that the ordi-
nance unlawfully discriminates against them, and the judg-
ment might well be upheld on this ground. However, there 
is no need of even considering the question of discrimination 
in the enforcement of the ordinance, as the evidence over-
whelmingly supports the finding that defendants' so-called 
nonconforming uses are a mere continuation of the uses to 
which their property had been devoted before the adoption of 
the ordinance and are therefore exempted by its provisions. 
I am in full accord with the views expressed in the opinion 
prepared by Mr. Presiding Justice Barnard of the District 
Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, which affirmed the 
judgment in this case. (See 99 A.C.A. 957 [222 P.2d 688].) 
I would therefore affirm the judgment. 
